The Arab protest in Um al-Fahem was simply crushed by force. The problem of the confiscated agricultural land was passed to a committee for reconsideration, but as of the time of writing (October 1999) the situation had changed little. The defence minister (Yitzhak Mordechai) reflected the general mood in Israeli Jewish discourse at the time in his claim, "The land is absolutely essential for our training, and besides, if we give it back here, we'll have to return to the Arabs many of the army's training grounds all over the country."6 Following these events, the Democratic Mizrahi Rainbow changed tack and began to demand not the redivision of national land but the transfer of Israeli public housing (whose residents are mainly low-income Mizrahim) to the ownership of their residents. Using a far more ethnonational rhetoric, which emphasized their contribution to the Zionist project of Judaizing the country, they gradually won public support and even managed to influence the passage of new legislation that may now turn this goal into reality.' The consequences among the Arabs are less clear, but reports of frustration and resignation in Um al-Fahem have also been linked to the strengthening of the Islamic movement and to the setting of new Islamic educational, cultural, and political agendas among the Arabs, some with subversive undertones.8
The two acts of protest serve as a telling entry point to the discussion of this essay, which deals with the position of peripheral groups vis-a-vis a repressive regime. They illustrate vividly the ability of a settling ethnic state (defined below) to subdue challenges from its peripheries, especially when these address issues fundamental to the regime's ethno-territorial logic. I will begin by sketching the scholarly and historical/geographical settings of the social phenomena I explore. The remainder of the essay will advance in three main stages, moving from theory, to analysis and critique of the Israeli regime, and later to an exploration of the mobilization of the two peripheral minorities.
Setting
In this essay I analyze critically the structure of a regime I have termed ethnocracy, and its impact on the position and identity of peripheral minorities.9 To this end I will probe the resistance to the Israeli Jew- 
On Nationalism, Ethnocracy, and Democracy
The conceptual approach of this essay emerges from the growing interest in nationalism, which has virtually exploded to occupy center stage in both the social sciences and the humanities." But my stance here is a critical one. Despite their illuminating insights and breathtaking endeavors, most studies of nationalism devote only scant attention to the impact of nationalism on intranational and intrastate disparities and cleavages, that is, the impact of nationalism on minorities. Most studies have thus largely ignored a critical tension between nation-and state-building, in what was termed by Anderson "the impending crisis of the nation-state hyphen."'2 Symptomatic of this deficiency has been a lack of engagement on the part of most theorists with the debates on civil society, postcolonialism, and the emergence of social movements, and a myopia towards the centrality of space, its contours and internal divisions.'" With these defi- Ethnocracy is a specific expression of nationalism that exists in contested territories where a dominant ethnos gains political control and uses the state apparatus to ethnicize the territory and society in question.'4 Ethnocracies are neither democratic nor authoritarian (or "Herrenvolk") systems of government. The lack of democracy rests on unequal citizenship and on state laws and policies that enable the seizure of the state by one ethnic group. They are not authoritarian, as they extend significant (though partial) political rights to ethnic minorities. As detailed elsewhere, ethnocracies emerge through a time/space fusion of three major forces:'5 (1) A settler and/or settling state that promotes external or internal forms of colonialism (the former typically by Europeans, the latter by the expanding core of ethnic states, such as Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Estonia, or Serbia); (2) rigid ethno-nationalism premised on an ethnic (and not territorial) self-interpretation of the legitimizing principle of selfdetermination, often buttressed by a supportive religious narrative; and (3) an "ethnic logic of capital," resulting in an uneven economic landscape and long-term stratification between ethno-classes, expressed by the flows of investment, development, and labor market niches. The polarizing effect of capital flow has worsened in recent decades following the increasing mobility of capital and the globalization of the world economy. '16 Despite the many important local variations, ethnocratic states are broadly typified by a social structure consisting of: (1) a powerful "charter group," the founding core of the dominant nation; (2) later groups of immigrants from ethnic backgrounds different from the charter group, who are incorporated (usually unevenly) upwards into the host society; and (3) relatively weak and dispossessed local, indigenous, or rival ethnic groups, which are generally excluded from the meaningful political and cultural realms." This structure exposes the inherent tension between In ethnocracies, as noted, the dominant ethno-class appropriates the state apparatus and attempts to structure the political system, public institutions, and state culture so as to further its control over the state and its territory. This results in the blurring of state borders in an effort to incorporate diasporic coethnics while at the same time weakening or neutralizing the citizenship of minorities. Estonia and Sri Lanka can serve as examples here. In the former all people of Estonian descent, wherever they live, are entitled to citizenship, while over half the Russians, who have resided in the state for over fifty years, are disenfranchised. In Sri Lanka over two million Tamils who have resided in the country for generations are denied citizenship through their classification as Indian Tamils, thereby maintaining the demographic dominance of the Sinhalese ethnos.
In both cases, as in Israel/Palestine, the notion of the demos is crucially ruptured. Yet the empowered demos-the community of equal residentcitizens-forms the basis for the establishment of democracy. Its diminution highlights the structural tensions between ethnocracy and democracy.
Ethnocracies and Democracies
My account of the ethnocratic regime involves a thorough critique of its common representation as democratic. On the one hand such a regime claims to be a full (and often even liberal) democracy, while on the other it routinely oppresses and marginalizes peripheral minorities and constantly changes the state structure in the majority's favor. The oppression of minorities is often exacerbated by the legitimacy granted to the state Needless to say, the term democracy is not taken uncritically here. It is a contested concept, hotly debated, rarely settled, and widely abused, particularly in multiethnic states. It is an institutional response to generations of civil struggles for political and economic inclusion, gradually incorporating and empowering the poor, women, and minorities into the once elitist polity.20 This is not the place to delve deeply into democratic theory. Suffice it to say that several key principles have emerged as foundations for achieving the main tenets of democracy-equality and liberty. These include equal citizenship; protection of individuals and minorities against the tyranny of states, majorities, or churches; and a range of civil, political, and economic rights.21 These are generally ensured by a stable constitution, periodic and universal elections, and free media. In multiethnic or multinational polities, as the seminal works of Arend Lijphart and Will Kymlicka have illustrated, a certain parity, recognition, and proportionality between the ethnic collectivities is a prerequisite for democratic legitimacy and stability. While no state ever implements these principles fully, and thus none is a pure democracy, ethnocratic regimes are conspicuous in breaching most tenets of democracy. "Ethnocracy" and Its Discontents la Gramsci. These include the rules, policies, and institutions affecting immigration, the spatial system of land and settlement, the state's constitution, the role of the military, the nature of the dominant culture, and the regulation of capital. These bases, each separately and together, powerfully mould ethnic relations in contested territories, but are rarely subject to day-to-day or electoral deliberation. Genuine debate on these taken-for-granted issues is generally absent from public discourse, especially among the dominant majority. But the dominance of the various "truths" behind these bases is, of course, not absolute and may be exposed and resisted as political entrepreneurs exploit the tensions and contradictions in the system to advance antihegemonic projects.
But in Israel most of the structural bases are still intact, as subjects such as immigration policies, the role of military, the state constitution, and even the ethnic nature of development policies (which routinely privilege Jews over Arabs) are rarely discussed in national Jewish politics. This is not accidental, of course; it allows the dominantJewish ethnos to extend its control over Palestinians (both in Israel and the occupied territories) through the use of discriminatory immigration, land, settlement, cultural, and development policies, as well as through the (nearly unquestioned) centrality of the (Jewish) army in the state's decision-making arenas.
Ethnocracy and Minorities
The crux of the ethnocratic system is its ability to maintain the control and dominance of the charter group. This is premised on the exclusion, marginalization, or assimilation of minority groups. But not all minorities are treated equally. Some are constructed as internal, whereas others are marked as external. A critical difference exists between those considered part of the so-called historical or even genetic nation and others whose presence is portrayed as a mere historical coincidence or as a danger to the security and integrity of the dominant ethnos. These discourses strip the means of inclusion in the meaningful sites of the nation from external minorities.25
Ethnocracies are driven, first and foremost, by a sense of collective entitlement on the part of the majority group to control what it thinks of as its state and its homeland-a sense of entitlement derived from the notion of a universal right for self-determination. Thus, belonging to the dominant ethno-nation is the key to attaining mobility and resources for peripheral groups and a strategy adopted by most immigrant minorities, who thereby distance themselves from indigenous or other external minorities.
The charter group can thus play a dual game. On the one hand it 25. See Peter Jackson and Jan Penrose, Constructions of Race, Place, and Nation (London, 1993).
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articulates a discourse of belonging that incorporates later migrant groups, inviting them into the moral community of the dominant ethnonation. But on the other hand the charter group uses this very discourse of inclusion and belonging to conceal the uneven effects of its strategies, which often marginalize the immigrants economically, culturally, and geographically. It would be a mistake, however, to treat this as a conspiracy; it is rather an expression of broad social interest, generally unspoken and unarticulated, which privileges social circles that are closest to the ethnonational core. This seemingly natural process tends to broadly reproduce, though never replicate, patterns of social stratification. The strategy towards indigenous minorities or fragments of rival nations is more openly oppressive. They are represented and treated at best as external to the ethno-national project, or at worst as a subversive threat. The principle of self-determination is used only selectively, pertaining to ethnicity and not to an inclusive geographical unit, as required by the basic principles of the nation-state order and by the tenets of democracy. Many of the projects that typify ethnocracies, namely, frontier settlement, land seizure, military expansion, and economic growth, encroach on the position and resources of local minorities. These projects are often wrapped in a discourse of modernity, progress, and democracy, but the very material reality they produce is unmistakable, entailing minority dispossession and exclusion.
However, the self-representation of most ethnocracies as democratic creates structural tensions because it requires the state to go beyond lip service to empower external minorities with some (though always less than equal) formal political powers. The cracks and crevices between the open claims for democracy and the denial of full minority participation harbor the tensions and conflicts typical of ethnocratic regimes.26
The dual game of a public democratic facade alongside structures of ethnic expansion and control is thus at work against both internal and external minorities, although there are differences in practice. The difference lies in the selective imposition of borders and boundaries. Ethnocracies typically impose a multiplicity of physical, legal, social, economic, and cultural boundaries that differentiate between ethno-classes. These have uneven levels of porousness: the dominant group can usually travel freely across boundaries; internal minorities are more restricted, often culturally and economically, while external minorities, are systematically excluded.
Finally, it must also be emphasized that the breaching of democratic principles in ethnocratic states is far more severe vis-a-vis minorities marked as external, due to the systematic rejection of these groups as "Ethnocracy" and Its Discontents There is a prevailing feeling among Arabs that under its current political structure the Israeli state is able to continue to reject, deflect, or ignore Arab demands for equality.66 Hence, antistate protest may be losing its appeal, while other modes of operation gain favor, including the strategic use of the Arabs' growing electoral clout, or the channelling of Arab energies into a quiet construction of political, social, economic, and cultural enclaves within Israel.67 Most recently, the ongoing absence of Arab political gains generated demands for cultural and religious autonomy and to turn Israel into a "state of all its citizens." In the Israeli ethnocratic setting these basic- 
